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COMMENTS
WHERE HAVE ALL THE BABY-DOCTORS GONE?
WOMEN'S ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE IN
JEOPARDY: OBSTETRICS AND THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS
Sarah Domin'
Procreation-it is one of our country's most fundamental rights,
guaranteed by the Constitution and championed by the Supreme Court.'
Yet, despite its protected status, the right to make decisions concerning
procreation is being threatened by an enemy that masks itself in the
noble ideals of justice and fairness.2  This enemy is the rapidly rising
medical malpractice insurance premiums, which in one year have
increased as much as 60% for those providers with particularly risky
services, such as obstetricians. Soaring malpractice insurance costs led
J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank her father for the inspiration to write on this topic, her
husband for his patience and encouragement, her sisters for their much-needed humor,
and her mother for the continued support, love, and ecouragement she has provided for
this and every other endeavor embarked on since childhood.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,536-38, 541(1942) (holding that forced sterilization of habitual criminals violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and deeming the right to procreate a fundamental
right essential to society).
2. See Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Lisa M. Hollier, M.D., M.P.H., The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), at http://www.acog.org.
3. Conversation with Doctor Wayne Domin, President of Lakes Region Ob-Gyn in
Laconia, N.H. (Nov. 15, 2002); Joseph B. Treaster, Rise in Insurance Forces Hospitals to
Shutter Wards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al. According to The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), an obstetrician is a physician who practices
obstetrics, which is defined as the medical specialty "that deals with the care of women
during pregnancy, childbirth, and the recuperative period following delivery." See
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1214 (4th ed. 2000). ACOG, an organization that
represents over 45,000 obstetricians and gynecologists, reports that most obstetricians are
also practicing gynecologists, and many family physicians are licensed to provide obstetric
care as well. See Roger A. Rosenblatt et al., Why do Physicians Stop Practicing
Obstetrics? The Impact of Malpractice Claims, 76 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 245
(1990). Therefore, unless otherwise specified, the term "obstetrician" and those statistics
concerning the practice of obstetrics refer to those doctors that provide obstetric care,
whether they are obstetricians, ob-gyns, or family physicians. According to a Medical
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to the closings of trauma and maternity wards across the country during
the summer of 2002,4 and have forced many obstetricians to give up
obstetrics, restrict services, deny certain high-risk patients, become
consultants, relocate, retire early, or abandon their practices all together.
5
Liability Monitor survey, the median ob-gyn insurance premium increased by 167% from
1982 to 1998. Hearing, supra note 2. The Medical Liability Monitor is a newsletter that
covers the liability insurance industry. Id. The median rate rose 7% in 2000, and 12.5% in
2001, with individual physician increases up to 69%. Id. Another study indicated that, in
1994, 53.1% of insurance carriers increased their rates by an average of 9.5% per insured
ob-gyn. Elizabeth Swire Falker, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in Obstetrics: A Gestalt
Approach to Reform, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3 (1997).
4. Treaster, supra note 3. During the summer of 2002, at least six hospitals
throughout the country closed their obstetric wards due to the increasing costs of medical
malpractice insurance. Id. Additionally, in July 2002, the only trauma center in Las Vegas
closed for ten days when the doctors went on strike, protesting the rising medical
malpractice insurance rates. See id. Bethany Maher, a twenty-three-year-old woman from
Gilford, New Hampshire, was nearly a casualty of this unprecedented closing when she
was involved in a serious car accident outside of Las Vegas on the first day the trauma
center reopened after the strike. Conversation with Bethany Maher (July 18, 2002). Had
the trauma center remained closed any longer, this aspiring social worker would have been
forced to travel an additional 300 miles to Los Angeles and risk facing debilitating
complications from her vertebrate injury. Id.
5. Treaster, supra note 3; Hearing, supra note 2; ACOG News Release, Statement of
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists on the Health Act of 2002
(April 25, 2002) [hereinafter News Release], at http://www.acog.org/from-home/
publications/pressjreleases/nr04-25-02.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). According to
ACOG, "When ob-gyns [cannot] find or afford liability insurance, they are forced to stop
delivering babies, curtail surgical services, or close their doors." Hearing, supra note 2.
Many older obstetricians are choosing to "play it safe" and retire early. Treaster, supra
note 3; see also Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 245 (stating that in one study,
obstetricians that chose to discontinue their practice because of rising liability insurance
costs were generally "older"). Other obstetricians who have stopped delivering babies
have become mere consultants, leaving the actual medical treatment to other physicians to
avoid the need for medical malpractice insurance altogether. Treaster, supra note 3, at
A20. For those obstetricians who choose not to stop delivering babies, another growing
trend is to restrict surgical services to low-risk procedures. Id. Other obstetricians have
chosen to deny care to patients considered "high risk" or those lacking insurance
coverage. See Dianne Schleuning et al., Addressing Barriers to Perinatal Care: A Case
Study of the Access to Maternity Care Committee in Washington State, 106 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 47, 47 (1991). This results in "inadequate prenatal and intrapartum care for that
portion of the population with the greatest need." Id. Rather than restrict services, many
obstetricians feel forced to move to states where the malpractice insurance prices have not
escalated so drastically. Treaster, supra note 3, at A20. The trend is not a new one, as
some researchers suggest that access to obstetrical services has been deteriorating since
the late 1980s. Schleuning et al., supra. In a 1988 Washington State study, 25% of the
subject obstetricians and family physicians ceased practicing obstetrics. Rosenblatt et al.,
supra note 3, at 245-46. Today, obstetricians are giving up obstetrics in record numbers,
and unfortunately, once an obstetrician stops delivering babies, the decision is rarely
reversed. See id. at 245.
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The problem is so far-reaching that it has affected over 1,300 healthcare
institutions.
The future of obstetrics looks particularly bleak considering the fact
that in certain areas, obstetricians cannot obtain any insurance coverage
because some insurance companies have terminated their obstetrics
coverage. This situation is so volatile that the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has identified twelve "red
alert states," where definite crises exist.8 Others disagree that a current
"crisis" exists, but they warn that one is inevitable.9 However, when
hospitals scale down services in droves and obstetricians face the
impossibility of obtaining insurance coverage, calling the problem a
"'crisis" seems perfectly reasonable.
Mississippi, perhaps the hardest hit of ACOG's "red alert states" has
seen 324 of its physicians cease delivering babies in the last decade.' In
fact, most Mississippi cities with populations of less than 20,000 people
no longer have obstetricians." Such startling statistics are a result of
6. Treaster, supra note 3. The American Hospital Association's survey further
illustrates the far-reaching nature of the problem: the survey reports that 20% of the 5,000
member hospitals and healthcare organizations have reduced services and 6% have
eliminated some units, many of which are obstetrical wards, due to the rising insurance
rates. Id.
7. See Hearing, supra note 2. In December 2001, the country's second largest
medical malpractice insurance carrier announced that it would not renew policies for
42,000 doctors nationwide; 60% of Las Vegas doctors are part of this group. Id.
8. Hearing, supra note 2. ACOG's "Red Alert States" include: Florida, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Id. In April of
2003, ACOG added Georgia, Ohio, Oregon, and Virginia to this list of states experiencing
acute malpractice insurance problems. News Release, AOCG, "Who Will Deliver My
Baby?" Ob-gyns, Patients Push US Senate for Tort Reform, A COG Names Latest "Red
Alert" States Facing Liability Insurance Crisis, at
http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/press-releases/nr04-28-03-2.cfm [hereinafter
Red Alert]. West Virginia, originally on ACOG's list of "red alert states," was moved to
what ACOG calls a "to-be-watched" category because the West Virginia legislature
recently enacted tort reform laws. Id.; Hearing, supra note 2. According to ACOG, "a
crisis is brewing in" Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Utah. Red
Alert, supra. In selecting these states, ACOG evaluated the following factors, all of which
affect the medical malpractice insurance crisis facing obstetricians: lack of available
professional liability coverage for ob-gyns; the number of insurance carriers currently
providing coverage, as well as the number leaving the medical liability market; the cost of
insurance premiums and their rate of annual increase based on industry monitor reports; a
combination of geographical, economic, and other conditions affecting the already existing
shortage of ob-gyns and other physicians; and the state's tort reform history and the
likelihood of future tort reforms being passed by the state's legislature and upheld by the
state's highest court. Hearing, supra note 2.
9. See James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical
Perspective, 283 JAMA 1731, 1736-37 (2000).
10. See Hearing, supra note 2.
11. George F. Will, Tort Reform Now, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002, at B7.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
rapidly rising Mississippi insurance premiums." The Mississippi State
Medical Association reports that medical malpractice insurance rates for
obstetricians increased between 20% and 400% in the past year,
depending on the insurance carrier, with annual rates ranging from
$40,000 to $110,000.13 Such premiums can account for as much as 20% of
obstetrics providers' gross revenue."
Obstetricians have struggled with increasing cost and availability of
medical malpractice insurance since the 1970s.15 According to ACOG,
12. Id.
13. See Hearing, supra note 2. The situation would be different if these insurance
hikes were affordable, but clearly, just the opposite is true. ACOG recently went so far as
to label the most recent rise in liability premiums as "meteoric." The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, How Caps Protect Women's Access to Health Care,
[hereinafter Caps], at http://www.acog.org/from-home/departments/dept-notice.cfm?
recno=11&bulletin=2078 (last visited Oct. 15, 2003). Unfortunately, such seemingly
sensational language does not exist as the fruit of ACOG's obvious biases. Rather, the
statistics show that the current cost of malpractice insurance really is astronomical. For
instance, in 1960, overall medical malpractice insurance costs were $60 million, but by
1991, they had risen over a hundred-fold to $5.6 billion. Rebecca A. Cerny, Arbitration or
Litigation: Efficacy and Fairness in Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes Through
Arbitration Proceedings, 27 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 193, 194 (1994). More recently, annual
professional liability insurance premiums have reached $10 billion nationwide. Id. On the
individual level, these costs are evidenced in the doubling and even tripling of premiums,
with some as high as $200,000 per year for obstetricians in Fort Lauderdale and Miami,
Florida. Treaster, supra note 3, at A20.
14. See Diane Levick, Insurers Squeeze State's Doctors; Malpractice Rates Increasing
Dramatically, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 2002, at Al (reporting that Connecticut's
rising medical malpractice insurance rates are consistent with the national trend).
15. See News Release, supra note 5. Similarly, since the 1970s, patients have been
experiencing a relatively high rate of medically related adverse events. See Michelle M.
Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1599-1600 (2002). In the following studies,
"adverse event" refers to an injury that either prolonged hospitalization or resulted in a
disability at the time of discharge, and one that was caused by medical management rather
than the natural disease process. Id. at 1599 n.22. A mid-1970s California study
conducted by the California Medical Association revealed that 4.65% of people
hospitalized suffered an adverse event, and .79% suffered an adverse event for which the
healthcare provider would likely be found liable. Id. at 1599. Similarly, in the mid-1980s,
after reviewing 30,000 medical records and 67,000 litigation records, researchers for the
Harvard Medical Practice Study estimated that 3.7% of- New York residents suffered
adverse events and 1% suffered adverse events attributable to negligence. Id. at 1599-
1600. When these statistics were upweighed to reflect the entire state population, the
study estimated that in 1984, nearly 7,000 New York residents died as a result of
negligence. Id. Even today, the occurrence of medical negligence or adverse events in our
hospitals and healthcare facilities is not uncommon. According to a Kaiser National
Survey conducted in 2000, 47% percent of Americans expressed concern that they would
suffer an injury due to medical mistake in the course of hospital care. Id. at 1630. If this
process proves true, an increase in medical malpractice rates would not appear unfounded.
However, the presence of negligence is not correlated with malpractice claims rates or
even the outcome of individual trials. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between
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obstetricians and their patients now face a malpractice insurance crisis
for the third time in three decades. 16 These crises have been marked by
rapidly increasing jury awards. Claims involving neurologically injured
infants account for 30% of all cases against obstetricians and the average
jury award in such a suit is nearly $1 million. Obstetrics also has
experienced growing claims rates and now fields more malpractice claims
than any other specialty.' 8 The frequency of claims has increased such
Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1966 (1996); Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1619.
16. See Hearing, supra note 2. In fact, many researchers and experts agree that there
have been at least two medical malpractice insurance crises since the 1970s. See, e.g.,
Mohr, supra note 9, at 1736-37. The insurance crises of the 1970s and 1980s were marked
by spiraling medical malpractice costs, diminishing liability insurance availability, and
increased liability insurance premiums. See Sandy Martin, M.D., Comment, NICA-Florida
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act: Four Reasons Why This Malpractice
Reform Must Be Eliminated, 26 NOVA L. REV. 609, 610-11 (2002). According to Dr.
Sandy Martin, "Patients and physicians were angry, and irrespective of where one wanted
to place the blame, what had started as a malpractice epidemic had become a malpractice
crisis." Id. at 611.
17. Hearing, supra note 2. In terms of general jury award trends, Jury Verdict
Research in Horsham, Pennsylvannia, reports that from 1995 to 2000, the average medical
malpractice jury award increased by more than 70% to $3.5 million, with a few claims
being over $40 million. Treaster, supra note 3, at A20. A more recent report indicated
that from 1999 to 2000, the median medical malpractice award increased from $700,000 to
$1 million, which is a 43% increase, and has doubled since 1995. Hearing, supra note 2.
Recently, a California jury delivered the highest individual tort verdict in United States
history, awarding the plaintiff $28 billion in punitive damages. California Jury Awards
Smoker $28 Billion: Decision Against Philip Morris is Largest Individual Award in a
Tobacco Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at A2. A sixty-nine-year-old woman, who
had been smoking since she was seventeen years old and was dying of cancer, was
successful in her lawsuit against tobacco giant Philip Morris U.S.A. Id.
18. Falker, supra note 3, at 2. The malpractice claims rate experienced by
obstetricians has risen dramatically in the last four years. See id. at 1. From 1982 to 1986,
the rate of obstetrics-related malpractice claims increased by as much as 113%. Id.
Obstetric malpractice claims referred to by these statistics are "those relating to the care
of [] pregnant wom[e]n, including [) prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum [care], and the
related care of the fetus and neonate." Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 246. A study of
obstetricians practicing in Washington State defined a medical malpractice claim as any
incident or occurrence that led the subject insurance company to open a formal claim file.
See id. Studies show that obstetricians experience more medical malpractice lawsuits than
physicians from all other specialties. Falker, supra note 3, at 2. One study revealed that
from 1990 to 1991, 53.9% of all malpractice claims involved obstetrics. Bill Clements,
Don't Get Sued, Dangerous Deliveries, Part IV, Avoiding Medical Malpractice, AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 1, 1994, at 21. According to the Physicians Insurance Association of
America, in 2000, ob-gyns had the highest number of claims filed against them out of
twenty-eight specialty groups. Hearing, supra note 2. Interestingly, obstetricians are
"three times more likely than family physicians to be the target of an obstetrically related
malpractice claim." Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 249. The greater volume of
deliveries performed by obstetricians, and the increased number of high-risk patients
cared for by obstetricians, explains this difference when compared to the number of
patients cared for by family physicians. Id.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
that, in 1999, 76.5% of obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) surveyed by
ACOG reported being sued at least once. 9 However, this high claims
rate does not indicate that obstetricians are more negligent than other
physicians, as negligence does not indicate trial outcome. 2' Rather,
studies show that severity of patient injury, and not the presence of
negligence, determines trial outcome. 2' Is a system that so often allows
for a finding of negligence when none exists really a justice system?
19. Hearing, supra note 2; see also Falker, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that 80% to 90%
of obstetricians "can expect to be sued during their career").
20. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 15, at 1966; Stephen S. Entman et al., The
Relationship Between Malpractice Claims History and Subsequent Obstetric Care, 272
JAMA 1588, 1590 (1994) (detailing a study that revealed that no relationship was found
between prior medical malpractice claims experience and the technical quality of
subsequent care rendered by Florida obstetricians). To say that obstetricians are sued
most frequently due to the risky nature of the procedures they perform implies that these
procedures involve negligence or adverse events more often than procedures performed
by physicians of other specialties. However, such an assumption is not supported, due to
the fact that the occurrence of an adverse event and/or negligence is not an indicator of
trial outcome. See id. In fact, obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) are successful in
defending most of the tort claims against them. Hearing, supra note 2. According to
ACOG, roughly 54% of the claims filed against ob-gyns were dismissed, dropped, or
settled without a payment, with ob-gyns winning 65% of the cases that ended with a
verdict. Id.
21. See Brennan, supra note 15, at 1963-66. This article presents a follow-up of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study, which indicated that the severity of patient injury, not
the occurrence of an adverse event or an adverse event due to negligence, is a predictor of
payment to the plaintiff. Id. A recent study conducted by ACOG and the American
Academy of Pediatrics found that 70% of fetal and neonatal neurologic injuries, such as
cerebral palsy, a major source of malpractice claims against obstetricians, were caused
prior to labor and delivery. See Neonatal Encephalopathy and Cerebral Palsy: Defining the
Pathogenesis and Pathophysiology, The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, American Academy of Pediatrics, at xvii- xviii (2003). This means that
deprivation of oxygen during delivery, the commonly cited cause of such injuries, is not in
fact the cause in the overwhelming majority of cases. Id. This ground-breaking study
provides compelling proof that the many obstetricians held responsible for such injuries
and ordered to pay damages have been blamed unjustly. See id.
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Due in part to the disproportionate claims rate facing them,2
obstetricians are leaving their practices in record numbers, and thereby
placing women's access to healthcare in jeopardy.2 3 Unfortunately, this
reduced access to care disproportionately affects poor and rural women
who already experience a disadvantage in their efforts to obtain
adequate healthcare for themselves and their children. 4 In fact, the
medically indigent, many of whom come from the inner city, and rural
inhabitants, are considered the most socially vulnerable groups in the
fight to ensure access to obstetric care for all women.25
To address this problem, its social origins must be identified.
Obstetricians are leaving the practice of obstetrics because they are
experiencing record high premiums.26 The premiums are high because
22. See Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47. The unavailability of obstetric services
also results from the increasing cost and number of medical malpractice suits affecting
obstetricians, which also lead to increases in insurance premiums. Id. Studies indicate
that obstetricians involved in medical malpractice claims are more likely to stop practicing
obstetrics. See, e.g., Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 248. A study examining the reasons
why physicians stop practicing obstetrics concluded that the personal involvement of
obstetricians with medical malpractice claims has a direct relationship with the decision to
discontinue obstetric practice. Id. at 249. According to the study, those who left obstetrics
"had experienced over twice the average rate of obstetric claims and had a 25% higher
rate of nonobstetric claims than their peers who continued to practice obstetrics." Id.
Hence, the experience of defending one malpractice claim does not lead the average
obstetrician to give up obstetrics; rather, it is a combination of factors. Id. According to
one study,
It is not the individual malpractice claim that persuades the physician to stop
practicing obstetrics so much as the cumulative effect of many irritants and
disincentives: the cost of purchasing malpractice insurance, the pervasive fear of
being sued, and a general rise in the level of tension in the obstetric suite.
Id. Other factors associated with the decision to stop delivering babies were the
physician's age, and the type and location of his or her practice. Id. at 248. However, the
age factor could relate to medical malpractice issues because older physicians, those
between fifty to sixty years old, may worry about the potential of post-retirement claims if
he or she continues practicing obstetrics. Id. at 249.
23. See Hearing, supra note 2; Falker, supra note 3, at 14; Schleuning et al., supra note
5, at 47; Treaster, supra note 3, at 1, 20.
24. Falker, supra note 3, at 14; Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47.
25. See Falker, supra note 3, at 14; Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47. Falker's
article describes how by hindering access to obstetric care, rising medical malpractice and
liability insurance rates most greatly hurt disadvantaged women, those living in rural
areas, and those with high-risk pregnancies. Falker, supra note 3, at 14; see also Roger A.
Rosenblatt, MD, MPH & Barbara Detering, BA, Changing Patterns of Obstetric Practice
in Washington State: The Impact of Tort Reform, 20 FAMILY MEDICINE 101, 106 (1988)
(detailing a study which found that rapidly increasing medical malpractice insurance
premiums among obstetricians result in reduced access to obstetric care in rural areas and
a severe curtailment of care to the medically indigent).
26. See Hearing, supra note 2; Treaster, supra note 3, at Al, A20. The fact that ob-
gyns are dropping obstetrics is not the only effect of high medical malpractice insurance
rates. See Hearing, supra note 2; Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47; Treaster, supra note
20041
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insurance companies assess obstetrics as a "high risk" specialty. 7 This
assessment results from the high obstetric claims rate, the delicate and
essential nature of the practice," and the potential for costly catastrophic
injury to the most vulnerable members of our society, infants.29 The
corresponding damages for such injury are particularly lofty because they
must account for an entire lifetime of injury.0 When faced with such
financially devastating damages, parents often will seek the help of an
attorney who aims to find negligence, even where none actually exists."
3, at Al, A20. Another effect of high medical malpractice premiums is the reduction of
subsidies from the federal government and private insurers. Treaster, supra. According to
Gavin Kerr, Chief Executive of Mercy Health System, "We had been subsidizing the
program because we had the resources . . . [blut as the malpractice premiums increased,
that dramatically shrunk the resources." Id.
27. See Hearing, supra note 2.
28. See Martin, supra note 16, at 612 ("One might infer also that obstetrical injuries
are worse, although not every obstetrical error is expected to be horrible."). In
researching possible remedies for the medical malpractice insurance crisis affecting
Florida obstetricians, the Florida legislature characterized obstetrics as a specialty
essential to our society. Id. According to Dr. Sandy Martin, "The Florida Legislature
correctly realized that ob-gyns were a subset of physicians that had a disproportionate, if
not unbearable insurance liability, but without whom our society would not function." Id.
at 611.
29. See Martin, supra note 16, at 611-13.
30. Maxwell J. Mehlan, Bad "Bad Baby" Bills, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 129, 133-34
(1994).
31. See Brennan, supra note 15, at 1966 (describing the results of a malpractice case
study). The presence of negligence does not necessarily correspond to malpractice claims
rates or even the outcome of individual trials. See id. Thus, the fact that only a small
fraction of medical malpractice claims result in plaintiff compensation suggests that
increased or high malpractice claims rates were not to blame for the insurance crises. A
1985 study suggested that only 4% of negligently injured patients are compensated for
their injuries. Neville M. Bilimoria, New Medicine for Medical Malpractice: The Empirical
Truth About Legislative Initiatives for Medical Malpractice Reform -Part I, 27 J. HEALTH
& HOsP. L. 268, 271 (1994). This low frequency of claims indicates that the cost of injury
due to negligence greatly outweighs the cost of actual claims. Id. Therefore, regardless of
whether negligence was the cause of a particular adverse birth outcome, obstetricians were
nonetheless sued. A July 2002 issue of USA Today quoted Carol Golin, editor of a
newsletter that has followed medical malpractice issues for years, as saying, "There are
neurologically impaired babies born that have nothing to do with what the physician did in
the prenatal state or the delivery .... [but when faced with the tremendous costs of caring
for such a child, parents] have no option but to go and sue, even if they like their
physician." Rita Rubin, Fed-up Obstetricians Look For a Way Out; Insurance Rates Drive
Some Off, Others Drive Away, USA TODAY, July 1, 2002, at D1.
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The result is a high rate of claims and a history of expensive jury awards
and settlements.32 These factors lead to the high insurance premiums
that force obstetricians to stop delivering babies.33
Therefore, obstetricians are caught in an ironic trap: they can practice
only if they have insurance, but insurance is so expensive that the cost
prohibits them from practicing.34 Something must be done before too
many obstetricians stop delivering babies or leave their practices
altogether. In order to ensure women's access to healthcare, effective
and comprehensive federal and state legislation is desperately needed.
This Comment examines how the medical malpractice insurance crisis
has influenced obstetricians and the manner in which they practice,
thereby affecting women's healthcare. First, this Comment examines
various malpractice reforms that could curb the rising premiums by
highlighting specific cases and statutes that address these reform options.
Next, this Comment analyzes these various approaches to reform,
focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of each. Finally, this
Comment argues that even in the face of these reforms something needs
to be done and suggests a reform alternative that draws from the best
aspects of the reforms previously discussed.
32. See Hearing, supra note 2; Treaster, supra note 3. Other factors, such as advances
in technology and the quality of the doctor-patient relationship, also may influence a
patient's decision to sue. See Falker, supra note 3, at 11. Obstetricians utilize various
forms of medical technology, including intravenous and fetal monitoring devices, not only
to minimize complications during labor, but also to avoid malpractice litigation. Id. at 16.
However, the use of this technology may actually lead to malpractice claims in certain
situations. Id. at 5-6, 16. For example, the use of an external fetal monitor (EFM) during
labor and delivery may lead to a false positive of fetal distress, which in turn, convinces the
physician to perform a cesarean section, a very invasive surgery, when not actually
necessary. Id. at 16. In 1978, doctors performed an estimated 96,500 cesarean sections for
this reason. Id.
33. See Treaster, supra note 3. The causes of the overall crisis, however, are not so
clear. ACOG, for example, looks to the legal system and blames high jury awards and
frivolous lawsuits for the insurance crisis. See Hearing, supra note 2. Studies show that
higher rates of lawsuits directly lead to increases in medical malpractice insurance
premiums. See Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47. Insurance companies, on the other
hand, point the finger at both high awards in malpractice lawsuits and general economic
factors. Treaster, supra note 3, at A20. For instance, some insurance companies admit
that they have had to increase premium prices due to the slumping stock market, a
problem that largely did not occur during the nineties because they were able to keep
prices low by relying on profits from the then-growing equity and bond markets. Id.
However, according to J. Robert Hunter, the insurance director of the Consumer
Federation of America, another cause of soaring premiums may be the mismanagement of
insurance companies. Id.
34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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I. GONE TO THE POLICY-MAKERS... EVERY ONE: EXISTING REFORM
AND ITS CORRESPONDING CASE LAW
A. An Alternative to the Tort System: No-Fault Compensation
Fortunately, in response to some of the earlier medical malpractice
crises, some states have already enacted malpractice legislation aimed at
reducing malpractice insurance rates.35 Nevertheless, given the recurring
nature of these crises, many of the statutes clearly are ineffective. In
addition, most of the statutes have taken the form of general tort reform
and, therefore, are not intended to remedy the insurance crisis of
obstetricians in particular.37 For example, the two statutes specifically
enacted to alleviate the problems faced by obstetricians and to ensure
women's access to care have proven to be relatively unsuccessful.9
Both Virginia and Florida enacted birth-related neurological injury
compensation acts in an effort to combat the malpractice insurance crisis
affecting obstetricians.39  Given that birth-related neurological injuries
are not only a common source of malpractice claims, but also tend to
result in the highest jury awards, it makes sense to remove the claims of
neurologically injured infants from the tort system to decrease the cost of
medical malpractice insurance premiums facing obstetricians. Such
programs aim to lift from the backs of physicians the most frivolous and
costly claims while at the same time compensating those patients with
legitimate claims.
35. See Arizona Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561
to 12-594 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); California Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2nd Exec. Sess. 4007; Florida Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301 (West Supp. 2003); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5628 (West Supp. 2003); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. LAW § 214-a (McKinney 2002); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474 (McKinney 2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie Supp. 2003); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000 (Michie Supp. 2003).
36. See Hearing, supra note 2; Mohr, supra note 9, at 1736-37 (describing factors
affecting medical malpractice crises).
37. See, e.g., Arizona Medical Malpractice Reform Act, § 12-561 to 12-594;
California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 2, § 12.5(b); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5628; N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 214-a; VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15.
38. See Martin, supra note 16, at 621, 624.
39. King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 410 S.E.2d 656,
660 (Va. 1991); Martin, supra note 16, at 612-13.
40. King, 410 S.E.2d at 660.
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1. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act'
In 1987, Virginia enacted the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Act (the Act) in response to the obstetric
malpractice crisis that was brewing in the state at that time. 2 Because
drastic measures currently taken by Virginia insurance companies would
43leave nearly one-fourth of all Virginia obstetricians without coverage,
the Act was specifically tailored to drive down the insurance premiums of
obstetricians." The ultimate purpose of the Act was to ensure that
malpractice coverage was available to all obstetricians.4 ' The Act was
designed to accomplish this goal by removing the most catastrophic
injuries from the tort system, thereby limiting most of the risk associatedS46
with the coverage of obstetrics. These debilitating injuries, commonly
referred to as "birth-related neurological injuries," are specifically
described in the Act's very narrow definition. 7
The Act is funded through the $5,000 annual fee required of
participating obstetricians,48 a $250 annual fee from non-participating
obstetricians,49 and a $50 per live birth fee from all hospitals.5 0 Despite
the imposition of these fees, the Act negates the need to hire an "expert
witness" for claim review because it provides for a three-doctor panel
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000. Virginia was first in the nation to enact no-fault
compensation legislation that focused exclusively on obstetrics-related malpractice claims.
Falker, supra note 3, at 20 n.118.
42. Falker, supra note 3, at 20. ACOG currently has identified Virginia as a "crisis
state." Red Alert, supra note 8.
43. Falker, supra note 3, at 20. In addition to record claim rates, high jury awards,
and soaring insurance premiums, two of Virginia's major malpractice insurance carriers
dropped obstetric coverage from their available policies and a third carrier threatened to
curtail seriously its obstetric coverage. Id.
44. Id.
45. See King, 410 S.E.2d at 660.
46. Falker, supra note 3, at 20.
47. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-5001 (Michie Supp. 2003). According to the Act, "birth-related neurological injury"
includes:
[I]njury to the brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the deprivation of
oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery or
resuscitation necessitated by a deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury that
occurred in the course of labor or delivery, in a hospital which renders the infant
permanently motorically disabled and (i) developmentally disabled or (ii) for
infants sufficiently developed to be cognitively evaluated, cognitively disabled.
Id.
48. Id. § 38.2-5020(A).
49. Id. § 38.2-5020(D).
50. Id. § 38.2-5020(C). Non-participating hospitals are protected by a $150,000
contribution cap for any twelve-month period. Id.
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appointed by the deans of Virginia's medical schools.51 This panel
determines whether the statute covers the injuries in a particular case. 2
A State medical licensing board reviews each claim covered by the Act to
evaluate physician competence and standards of care, thereby weeding
out "bad apples" and improving doctor performance.53
Compensation under the Act includes actual damages such as medical
expenses, rehabilitation, and residential and custodial care.54 This also
includes the purchase and use of special equipment and injury-related
travel expenses.55 The Act includes a provision for loss of wages in the
56amount of 50% of the average state wage. However, the Act does not
compensate plaintiffs for any pain and suffering, which means that
patients seeking these damages likely will still sue in tort, where such
damages are permitted.57
In order to pass constitutional muster, the Act allows for a civil action
where "clear and convincing" evidence demonstrates that the physician
or hospital willfully caused or intended to cause a birth-related
neurological injury. 8 Although the Act does not require participating
obstetricians and hospitals to notify their patients of their participation in
the program,5 9 the Act has nonetheless withstood constitutional attacks.
60
In King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
51. Id. § 38.2-5008(B); see also Falker, supra note 3, at 21.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008(B).
53. Id. § 38.2-5008(A)(6); Falker, supra note 3, at 21.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(A)(1).
55. Id. The statute does not indicate what constitutes "injury-related travel"
expenses. See id.
56. Id. § 38.2-5009(3).
57. Falker, supra note 3, at 21-22. The Act even provides for the medical care of low-
income women by requiring participating physicians to help develop programs that serve
the obstetrical needs of patients eligible for public health services and those who are
indigent. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001.
58. Id. § 38.2-5002(C). According to the Act,
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, a civil action shall not
be foreclosed against a physician or a hospital where there is clear and
convincing evidence that such physician or hospital intentionally or willfully
caused or intended to cause a birth-related neurological injury, provided that
such suit is filed prior to and in lieu of payment of an award under this chapter.
Such suit shall be filed before the award of the Commission becomes conclusive
and binding as provided for in § 38.2-5011.
Id.
59. Galen of Fla., Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1997) (determining that the
Act's purpose "bears a reasonable relationship to the provision for assessments, and that
the assessments are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory ... ").
60. See King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 410 S.E.2d
656, 661-62 (Va. 1991).
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Program," the highest court in Virginia upheld the Act against equal
protection and due process challenges. 2 The King court reasoned that
no constitutional violations occurred because the Act's classifications and
assessments were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and because they
bore a reasonable relationship to the Act's purpose.63  By removing
certain narrowly defined types of birth-related neurological injuries from
the tort system, this legislation aims to reduce the number of damage
awards that result from malpractice claims against obstetricians.
2. Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act65
Like Virginia's Act, Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act (NICA) was adopted as a solution to the problems
faced by Florida obstetricians.6 It was modeled after the strict liability
worker's compensation plans, under which a claimant does not need to
establish fault and the claim is handled administratively rather than
legally.67  NICA focuses on birth-related neurological injury, which
according to the statute's definition, only refers to a narrow class ofS • • 68
injuries. Notably, this already narrow definition only applies to those
61. 410 S.E.2d 656.
62. Id. at 661-62.
63. Id. at 659-61. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated equal protection and
due process guarantees on both the state and federal level. Id. The court stated:
It is reasonably conceivable that the General Assembly concluded that the
removal of the claims of neurologically injured infants from the tort system
would decrease the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums for all
physicians and, thus, make medical malpractice insurance available to all
physicians practicing in Virginia, including the doctors in this proceeding.
Accordingly, we hold that the classification is not arbitrary and that it bears a
reasonable and substantial relation to a legitimate object sought to be
accomplished by the legislation.
Id. at 660.
64. See Falker, supra note 3, at 20.
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-.316.
66. See Martin, supra note 16, at 609-10; see also Hearing, supra note 2. According to
ACOG, Florida obstetricians have been hit very hard by medical malpractice insurance
crises. Id. During the crisis of the 1980s, for example, the liability situation in Florida was
so extreme that the state allowed its physicians to practice without liability coverage on
the condition that they could post bond or prove their ability to pay a judgment of up to
$250,000. See id.
67. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-.316; Martin, supra note 16, at 613.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.302(2). According to NICA, a birth-related neurological
injury only refers to the following:
Injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for
a single gestation or, in the case of multiple gestation, a live infant weighing at
least 2,000 grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury
occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate
2004]
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infants born alive and those over a certain minimum birth weight,69
thereby further restricting the statute's applicability and encouraging
legal action only for serious injuries resulting in death.
NICA limits compensation for injuries to $100,000 plus actual expenses
for certain medically reasonable bills related to the infant's medical care,
rehabilitative care, training, and custodial care.70 Considering that the
average jury award in cases of neurologically injured infants is nearly $1
million, this limit is relatively low.71 However, if the claimant is not
successful and the infant's injuries are found to be noncompensable, he
72
or she may pursue a remedy in tort.
To receive the benefits of NICA, the statute requires every licensed
physician in the state to pay a $250 annual fee, with participating
obstetricians paying $5,000 per year." Also, every hospital must pay anannual assessment of $50 per infant delivered in the hospital during the
postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and
substantially mentally and physically impaired.
Id.
69. Id.
70. § 766.31(1)(a)-(b)l. The statute states:
(a) Actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable medical and
hospital, habilitative and training, family residential or custodial care,
professional residential, and custodial care and service, for medically necessary
drugs, special equipment, and facilities, and for related travel. However, such
expenses shall not include:
1. Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is entitled
to receive, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to
the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law.
2. Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is
contractually entitled to receive, from any prepaid health plan, health
maintenance organization, or other private insuring entity.
3. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which
the infant is entitled to receive reimbursement, under the laws of any state
or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be
prohibited by federal law.
4. Expenses for which the infant has received reimbursement, or for which
the infant is contractually entitled to receive reimbursement, pursuant to the
provisions of any health or sickness insurance policy or other private
insurance program.
Expenses included under this paragraph shall be limited to reasonable charges
prevailing in the same community for similar treatment of injured persons when
such treatment is paid for by the injured person.
Id. § 766.31(1)(a)1.-4.
71. See Hearing, supra note 2.
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.304 (West Supp. 2003). According to the statute, "If it is
determined that a claim filed under this act is not compensable, neither the doctrine of
collateral estoppel nor res judicata shall prohibit the claimant from pursing any and all
civil remedies available under common law and statutory law." Id.
73. Id. § 766.314(4)(b)(1); § 766.314(4)(c).
[Vol. 53:499
Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone?
previous year.74 A group of Florida physicians soon challenged these
statutorily mandated fees."
In McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan,76 the appellate court upheld NICA with respect to
the assessment provision. 7 The McGibony court held that the "tax"
imposed on all physicians is constitutional even though the plan primarily
affects only obstetricians .7  The court found that the tax actually benefits
all Florida physicians because it will lead to a more efficient healthcare
system overall.7 9 According to McGibony, equal protection guarantees
did not violate the assessment provision because the physicians were not
being singled out as a class, based on their profession, nor were they
forced to pay a fee that does not benefit them."'
NICA also requires that each participating physician, and their
associated hospitals, give "clear and concise" notice of their participation
in the plan to their patients."1 In Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff,8" the
Supreme Court of Florida held that in order to invoke NICA as the
81exclusive remedy, notice must be given prior to delivery. More
74. Id. § 766.314(4)(a).
75. See McGibony v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Plan, 564 So.2d
177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
76. 564 So.2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
77. McGibony, 564 So.2d at 178.
78. Id. at 178-79.
79. Id. at 179.
80. Id. According to the McGibony court,
Since one of the goals of the [NICA] Plan is to help alleviate the crisis and permit
the efficient delivery of health care services by all members of the team, plaintiffs
[who are all non-participating physicians] are undeniably related to at least one
of the goals of the Plan and stand to benefit from its realization.... Thus, the
Legislature's decision to require plaintiffs to contribute to the Plan was not
wholly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Id.
81. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
766.316 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the association and shall
include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and limitations under
the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the
patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice from. Signature of the
patient acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption
that the notice requirements of this section have been met.
Id.
82. 696 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1997).
83. Id. at 311. In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida answered the following
certified question from the First District Court of Appeal: "Whether [FLA. STAT. §
766.316] requires that health care providers give their obstetrical patients pre-delivery
notice of their participation in the Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury
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specifically, if the provider claims NICA as the exclusive remedy, notice
must be given at a "reasonable" time before delivery;"' however, if pre-
delivery notice is not practicable in a particular case, such notice will not
be required. 5  Looking to legislative intent,86 the court reasoned that
without such notice, the claimant would be giving up his or her
constitutional right to sue in tort without due process of law. 87 The
Braniff court further asserted that its holding would not hinder the
statute's goal of stabilizing soaring medical malpractice insurance
premiums because pre-delivery notice would not be required where it
was "not practicable." 8
Both of these decisions, as well as those dealing with the Virginia Act,
reflect how both NICA and Virginia's Act have withstood constitutional
challenges thus far. Nevertheless, these cases also issue a warning of the
possible constitutional challenges that similar statutes might face if
enacted in other states or by the federal government. Other jurisdictions
may not decide in favor of notice and fee provisions akin to those in
NICA and Virginia's Act.
B. Tort Reform: Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations aims to ensure finality and predictability in the
justice system by establishing a limited time period during which a claim
must be brought. 89 With regard to medical malpractice lawsuits, a statute
of limitations serves to discourage the filing of "long tail" claims,90 which
are difficult to defend and unduly elongate the resolution process.91
Compensation Plan as a condition precedent to the provider invoking NICA as the
patients' exclusive remedy?" Id.
84. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.316 (West Supp. 2003); see also Braniff, 696 So.2d at 311.
The statute states that notice need not be given to a patient when the patient has an
emergency medical condition as defined in section 395.002(9)(b), or when notice is not
practicable. Id.
86. In using the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act as a
model, the legislature was concerned that the Virginia Act lacked a notice provision.
Braniff, 696 So.2d at 310.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 311.
89. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 666-67 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
90. Long-tail claims are those that are filed many years after the injury in question.
See Young v. Haines, 718 P.2d 909, 915 (Cal. 1986).
91. See id.
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1. California
In 1975, California enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA), which includes a statute of limitations provi 92Act(MIRA) h in ud   tt of i nsprovision. The
California legislature adopted MICRA in response to the major medical
malpractice insurance crisis brewing in California at that time.93 The
statute of limitations provision, codified in section 340.5 of the California
Civil Procedure Code, requires the initiation of all medical malpractice
actions within three years from the date of the injury, regardless of when
•94
the injury was discovered. The statute allows the time limit to be tolled
only in cases of fraud, intentional concealment, or the presence of
nontherapeutic and nondiagnostic foreign bodies.9 Minors are held to
the same time period unless they are under six years old at the time of
injury, in which case the tort action must be commenced within three
years or before the minor turns eight years old, whichever is longer.96
In Kite v. Campbell,97 a California appeals court found that section
340.5 was constitutional as it applied to minors.9 Despite the fact that
the statute treats minor victims of medical malpractice tortfeasors
differently from other minor victims of tortfeasors, the court found that
the statute was rationally related to the state's goal of ensuring quality
access to healthcare, and therefore did not violate equal protection
guarantees. 99 Similarly, the court held that the statute did not violate the
plaintiff's right to due process of law because the enactment of a statute
of limitations does not destroy fundamental rights, but rather representsa legslatve .100
a legislative prerogative. The court also found that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague, 10' and proceeded to read a common law
discovery rule into the statute.1°2
92. California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), ch. 2, § 12.5,
1975 Cal. Stat. 2nd Exec. Sess. 4007; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 340.5 (Deering 1991).
93. Haines, 718 P.2d at 914. MICRA can be summarized by three main objectives: 1)
to reduce incidence and severity of injuries resulting from medical malpractice; 2) to
curtail excessive insurance premium increases; and 3) to reduce the cost and efficiency of
medical malpractice litigation. MICRA, ch. 2, § 12.5.
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN § 340.5 (Deering 1991).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 191 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
98. Id. at 364.
99. Id. at 366-67.
100. Id. at 367.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 368-69. According to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations period
does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the
injury. Id.
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However, three years later in Young v. Haines,'3 the Supreme Court of
California criticized the King holding, arguing that the appellate court
erred when it applied the common law discovery provision to the
statute.i1 4 Rather, the Young court held that the three tolling provisions
applicable to adults-namely the fraud, intentional concealment, and
foreign body provisions-also applied to minors.' 5  By declining to
interpret the statute in a fashion that would discriminate against minors,
the court was satisfied that the statute was rationally related to the state's
goal, therefore negating any equal protection violation.'0
6
2. Louisiana
Louisiana has enacted a statute of limitations provision in response to
the medical malpractice insurance crisis facing the state's physicians.07
The statute was designed to stabilize skyrocketing malpractice insurance
premiums by limiting the length of time in which plaintiffs could bring
malpractice actions.'9" Louisiana's statute requires the filing of all
malpractice claims within one year from the date of the actual injury or
discovery of the injury.'9
103. 718 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1986).
104. Id. at 915-16.
105. Id. at 916, 919.
106. Id. at 919. In upholding the MICRA's statute of limitations provision, Chief
Justice Bird of the Supreme Court of California wrote,
[T]he construction of section 340.5 which the court adopts today avoids [the]
constitutional problem [of discrimination against minor medical malpractice
plaintiffs]. Further, this construction follows previous decisions which
recognized, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the Legislature intended
to achieve the goal of lowering malpractice insurance premiums in a rational
manner.
Id.
107. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305, 308-09 (La. 1986).
108. Id.
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5628 (West Supp. 2003). According to section 5628:
[N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor,
nurse, licensed midwife practitioner, dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital
or nursing home duly licensed under the laws of this state, or community blood
center or tissue bank.. .whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or
otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year
from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the
date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to
claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such
claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of
the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
Id. Accordingly, even if brought within one year of the discovery of a particular injury, a
claim will be permitted only if it is no more than three years from the date of the original
injury. Id. However, if a plaintiff is to utilize this delayed discovery exception, the claim
nonetheless must be filed within three years of the original date of injury. Id. Therefore,
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The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Crier v.
Whitecloud,"" when the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the
statute did not violate the plaintiff's due process or equal protection
rights. " ' The court also found no infringement of the Louisiana
constitution's "open courts clause."'"1 2 In reviewing the plaintiff's access
to courts claim, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on legislative intent
to conclude that the clause did not bar the state from restricting causes of
action or creating certain areas of statutory immunity from suit."'
As to the plaintiff's due process claim, the court, citing Supreme Court
cases, Boddie v. Connecticut"4 and Martinez v. California,"5 determined
that the federal due process clause did not guarantee access to courts for
all individuals at all times. " " The court held that the state government
has the right to limit the causes of action, provided that it does so in
order to promote a rationally-related purpose."7 Finally, applying the
rational basis test, the court found no federal equal protection violations
because the plaintiff failed to show that the statute did not further a
legitimate state purpose.""
3. New York
New York's statute proscribing special statute of limitation periods for
medical malpractice cases requires that all medical malpractice actions
commence within two years and six months of the date of the alleged act,
omission, or failure." 9 However, the statute provides a limited, delayed
discovery exception where the malpractice involves a foreign object in
the patient's body.'2" In such a case, the action must commence within a
year of when the object was discovered or when facts that would
reasonably lead to such a discovery were ascertained. 2 '
this provision prevents claimants from bringing actions many years after a known injury
under the guise that the claimant had not yet discovered it. See id.
110. 496 So.2d 305 (La. 1986).
111. Id. at 309, 311.
112. Id. at 309-10; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22. Article 1, Section 22 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an
adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial,
partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or
other rights." Id.
113. Crier, 496 So.2d at 309-10.
114. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
115. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
116. Crier, 496 So.2d at 308.
117. Id. at 308-09.
118. Id. at 311.
119. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 214-a (McKinney 2003).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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As of 2003, two cases have addressed New York's section 214-a as
applied to obstetrics related malpractice claims.12  In Branigan v.
DeBrovner, '2 the court held that prenatal care counts as "continuous
treatment" and therefore extends to the time of birth.2 4 Thus, in cases
alleging negligent infliction of injury to the mother in the course of
prenatal care, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
time of delivery.'25
In LaBello v. Albany Medical Center Hospital,16 the court concluded
that the infant plaintiff's medical malpractice action, based on alleged
negligence occurring prior to birth, began to toll at live birth rather than
when the alleged negligence occurred. 27  Under this interpretation,
prenatal time will not count against plaintiffs, thereby providing injured
neonates with reasonable time in which to sue.
C. Tort Reform: Jury Award Caps and the Elimination of Putative
Damages
1. Jury Award Caps
The extreme nature of lawsuits against obstetricians has reached such
proportions that suits cover not only alleged negligence, but also
negligent infliction of emotional distress, which does not involve physical
injury. Additionally, these lawsuits facing obstetricians call for high
jury awards. For instance, 30% of claims against obstetricians involve
neurological birth-related injuries that boast an average jury award of $1
million, with occasional awards reaching the $100 million mark.' 29 With
the threat of such financially devastating lawsuits looming over so many
obstetricians, it is no wonder that the purchase of malpractice insurance
is not only suggested but imperative. The threat of such costly lawsuits
122. LaBello v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 651 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1995); Branigan v.
DeBrovner, 612 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
123. 612 N.Y.S.2d 119.
124. Id. at 122.
125. Id.
126. 651 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1995).
127. Id. at 909, 911-12.
128. See Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Cal. 1992). In Burgess, the
plaintiff's child suffered a prolapsed umbilical cord, which deprived the infant of oxygen
for approximately forty-four minutes, therefore causing severe permanent brain and
nervous system damage that resulted in the child's eventual death. Id. at 1198-99. The
Supreme Court of California held that a mother whose child was injured during the course
of labor could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the attending
obstetrician even where she suffered no physical injury. Id. at 1198. This case
demonstrates the extent to which courts and juries have gone in finding negligence out of
adverse outcomes.
129. See Hearing, supra note 2.
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serves as a contributing factor in insurance companies' assessment of
obstetricians as "risky.' 130 For this reason, ACOG advocates the
adoption of statutory limitations on damages in medical malpractice
cases as the most effective means of stabilizing the skyrocketing
malpractice insurance premiums.'3 '
a. California
As part of California's 1975 MICRA, section 3333.2 mandates a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in cases where a verdict is
returned against a physician or hospital for acts of malpractice.,
32
Noneconomic damages refer to those damages other than actual
damages that include pain and suffering.' 3   Despite its revolutionary
nature, this provision has withstood numerous constitutional challenges
since its enactment.
34
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group and Hoffman v. United States,
courts held that MICRA's cap did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 35 Specifically, in Fein, the Supreme Court of California
held that the statute does not deny due process because section 3333.2
rationally relates to the state's legitimate interest in reducing the cost of
medical malpractice insurance. 36 Likewise, applying the same rational
basis test, in Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute did not
violate equal protection.
37
More recently, the court addressed the scope of MICRA's jury award
. - 138
cap in Western Steamship Lines v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital,
finding that the cap applied even in an action for partial equitable
indemnification by a concurrent tortfeasor 39 Citing public policy, the
court reasoned that to exempt indemnity actions from the monetary
recovery limit would threaten the statute's purpose of reducing the cost
of malpractice insurance premiums. 40 Therefore, the court concluded
130. See id.
131. Caps, supra note 13.
132. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3333.2(b) (West 1997).
133. Id. § 3333.2(a).
134. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v.
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 681 (Cal. 1985); W. S.S. Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hosp., 876 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Cal. 1994); Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383,
386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
135. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680-81.
136. Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
137. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437.
138. 876 P.2d 1062.
139. Id. at 1063.
140. Id. at 1068-69. Western Steamship Lines held that:
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
that MICRA's section 3333.2 necessarily furthered the government's
goal.' 4' The outcome of this case reflects the California Supreme Court's
devotion to MICRA, as well as the statute's parallel goals of stabilizing
malpractice insurance premiums and ensuring access to healthcare for all
citizens. 142
b. Virginia
In 1976, the Virginia legislature adopted a jury award cap in response
to increasing malpractice insurance cost and unavailability.' 43 Virginia's
jury award cap sets a limitation of $1.7 million on recovery for medical
malpractice that occurred on or after August 1, 1999.' 4" In Etheridge v.
Medical Center Hospitals,141 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the
statute against a constitutional attack based on both a federal and state
right to a trial by jury.'46 According to the court, the statute did not
infringe on the right to a trial by jury because once the jury ascertained
the facts and assessed the damages, the constitutional mandate was
satisfied. 47 The cap merely established the limits of a remedy as a matter
of law, not a matter of fact, and therefore removed the issue from the
jury's responsibilities. 4"  Applying a rational basis test, the court also
found no federal or state due process violation because the state's goal of
MICRA... reflects a strong public policy to contain the costs of malpractice
insurance by controlling or redistributing liability for damages, thereby
maximizing the availability of medical services to meet the state's health care
need'.... The Legislature could reasonably have determined that an across-the-
board limit would provide a more stable base on which to calculate insurance
rates".... Exempting indemnity actions from the $250,000 limit would threaten
not only this goal, but the broader purpose of MICRA by resurrecting the pre-
MICRA instability associated with unlimited noneconomic damages and
increasing the overall cost of malpractice insurance to account for these larger
recoveries.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 1069.
142. See Young v. Haines, 718 P.2d 909, 914 (Cal. 1986) (describing how the California
legislature hailed curtailment of excessive medical malpractice insurance premium
increases as one of MICRA's main objectives); see also California Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2nd Exec. Sess. 4007.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000); see Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps.,
376 S.E.2d 525, 527-28 (Va. 1989).
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000). The cap was originally set at $1.5
million when the law was enacted in 1976, but has increased by $50,000 per year beginning
in 2000. Id.
145. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
146. Id. at 529.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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maintaining adequate healthcare services was reasonably related to the
legislative cap.141
2. Elimination of Punitive Damages
Unlike actual damages, punitive damages are not a form of
compensation, but serve to punish the defendant and deter that party
and others from committing similar acts in the future."5 Restriction or
elimination of such damages arguably serves to contain medical
malpractice jury awards, therefore reducing the risk that insurance
companies will have to insure physicians against this costly form of
damages. 5 ' Embracing this theory, a few states, such as Illinois, have
implemented medical malpractice reforms that include various punitive
damage limitations. 1
5 2
As part of the 1985 Illinois Medical Malpractice Reform Act,' 53 the
Illinois legislature eliminated punitive damages in order to help address
the rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums.'5 4  The statute
prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in medical or legal
malpractice cases.'55 The statute also prohibits exemplary, vindictive, and
aggravated damages; 56 therefore, obstetricians in Illinois are not
threatened by lawsuits where costly punitive damages are at stake. 57 The
149. Id. at 531. The Etheridge decision was recently reaffirmed in Pulliam v. Coastal
Emergency Services of Richmond, Inc., when the Virginia Supreme Court once again
concluded that the cap did not violate any constitutional guarantees, specifically those of
due process and equal protection. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond,
Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,310 (Va. 1999).
150. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Loitz v. Remington Arms
Co., 563 N.E.2d 397,401 (111. 1990).
151. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 776 (II. 1986). ("The elimination of awards
for punitive damages in actions for medical malpractice serves the legislative goals of
reducing damages generally against the medical profession."); see also Tanya Albert, Bush
Decries "Junk Lawsuits," Calls for Federal Tort Reform, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 12, 2002.
In an August 2002 speech in Greensboro, N.C., President Bush proposed a framework for
federal legislation that included a limit on punitive damages in medical malpractice cases.
Albert, supra. The President's proposal set the limit at $250,000 or twice the economic
damages, whichever is less. Id. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, the President
again called for tort reform. See Richard W. Stevenson, President Asks Congress for
Measures Against Frivolous Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A20.
152. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West 2003).
153. Id.
154. Bernier, 497 N.E.2d at 768.
155. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West 2003). Illinois' prohibition of punitive
damages provision provides that, "[iun all cases, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in
which the plaintiff seeks damages by reason of legal, medical, hospital, or other healing art
malpractice, no punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages shall be allowed."
Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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elimination of this threat should decrease risks of obstetric coverage,
thereby helping to lower premiums.
The constitutionality of the statute was addressed in Bernier v.
Burris.5 9 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the statute did not
violate equal protection or due process rights under either the federal or
state constitutions. "0 In doing so, the court found that the punitive
damages provision was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.16  Therefore, in Illinois at least, statutes that mandate theelimination of punitive damages have been found constitutional.6 1
D. Tort Reform: Abolition of the Collateral Source Rule
1. Arizona
In an effort to control the rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums burdening Arizona doctors, the legislature enacted the
Arizona Medical Malpractice Act (AMMA)163 in 1976. The AMMA
originally required submission of all medical liability cases to a medical
liability review panel consisting of a judge, an attorney, and a doctor or
licensed healthcare provider in the same specialty as the defendant.
164
The panel would hold a hearing and file a decision in favor of one of the
parties, which either of the parties could reject. 6 1 If either party rejected
the panel's decision, the plaintiff then could pursue a remedy in tort.'
61
• 167
Finally, the AMMA abolishes the collateral source rule, which requires
158. See Hearing, supra note 2; Treaster, supra note 3; supra notes 27-33 and
accompanying text.
159. Bernier, 497 N.E.2d at 779.
160. Id.; See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
161. Bernier, 497 N.E.2d at 776.
162. See id. at 766, 769.
163. See Arizona Medical Malpractice Reform Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
561 -12-594 (West 2002); see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz. 1977).
164. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-561, 12-567(B) (West 2002) (repealed 1989).
165. Id. § 12-567(G) (repealed 1989).
166. Id. § 12-567(J) (repealed 1989). The original act required the plaintiff to post a
$2,000 bond if the decision was made to proceed with litigation, but the Supreme Court of
Arizona held this provision unconstitutional in Eastin. Eastin, 570 P.2d at 754.
167. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565(A). According to Arizona's abolition of
collateral source provision:
In any medical malpractice action against a licensed health care provider, the
defendant may introduce evidence of any amount or other benefit which is or
will be payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the injury or death
pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any state or federal workers'
compensation act, any disability, health, sickness, life, income-disability or
accident insurance that provides health benefits or income-disability coverage
and any other contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or
corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the cost of income-disability or
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that any evidence of outside benefits received by the injured, such as
insurance payoffs, be excluded from trial; as well, it prohibits any
reductions of damages based on such benefits.'6
Arizona's abolition of this rule was upheld by Arizona's highest court
in Eastin v. Bloomfield.169 Specifically, the court held that the collateral
source rule did not violate Arizona's constitutional prohibition against
"special laws."' 7  Instead, the court found the AMMA to be an
acceptable general law that "operates alike upon all of a given class,"
namely healthcare providers and those suing them. 7' The court also held
that this provision was constitutional because it allows the jury to ignore
the collateral benefits received by a given plaintiff, amd as such, it does
not constitute a limitation on damages and does not violate the Arizona
Constitution.'
72
2. Kansas
Section 60-471 of the Kansas Statute, enacted in response to the
medical malpractice crisis in that state, modified the traditional collateral
source rule as it applied to medical malpractice cases, and aimed to
reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums by lowering judgments
in malpractice lawsuits.' Differing slightly from the Arizona provision,
the Kansas statute did not abolish the rule completely, but rather,
admitted evidence of any reimbursement or indemnification received by
the injured party, other than payments from such party's insurance
company. 174 Under the statute, a jury was not allowed to hear evidence
that some services actually were paid for by insurance, but could hear
evidence that a service was provided for free.'75
However, this distinction was challenged and ultimately found
unconstitutional in Doran v. Priddy.76 The Kansas District Court found
that the distinction between insurance and gratuitous sources violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because it
medical, hospital, dental or other health care services to establish that any cost,
expense, or loss claimed by the plaintiff as a result of the injury or death is
subject to reimbursement or indemnification from such collateral sources.
Id.
168. Eastin, 570 P.2d at 751.
169. Id. at 754-55.
170. Id. at 752, 755.
171. Id. at 752; see also ARIZ. CONST., art IV, pt. 2, § 19.
172. Eastin, 570 P.2d at 752-53; ARIZ. CONST., art XVIII, § 6.
173. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471 (repealed 1985); Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30, 35,
39 (D. Kan. 1981).
174. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471(a) (repealed 1985).
175. Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 35.
176. Id. at 37.
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discriminated against injured plaintiffs who relied on charity for their
care versus those who had insurance. 77 The Kansas Legislature repealed
the statute in response to the court's decision.78 Therefore, in light of the
varying constitutional paths of the Kansas and Arizona statutes, clearly
courts are not in agreement on the issue of collateral source rule
reform.
79
E. Tort Reform: Monetary Limitations on Plaintiffs Attorney Fees
According to ACOG, less than half of the money awarded in medical
liability settlements ever reaches the plaintiff."'8 This is partly because a
rather large percentage of the jury award goes to the plaintiff's
attorney."" For the medical malpractice attorney working on a
contingency fee basis, the high jury awards associated with obstetrical1 • • 182
claims may serve as an incentive to file actions against obstetricians.
Some states have instituted limitations on the contingent fees charged by
attorneys involved in malpractice suits.
83
1. New York
New York, for example, enacted section 474-a in an effort to reduce
the monetary incentive for attorneys to seek excessive jury awards and to
ensure that more of the award goes to the plaintiff." 4 The provision only
targets contingent fees and has the greatest impact on the fees associated
with larger jury awards.8 Specifically, the statute outlines a graduated
177. Id. Four years after the federal court's decision in Doran, the Supreme Court of
Kansas affirmed the Doran decision and struck down the statute on equal protection
grounds. Wentling v. Med. Anesthesia Servs., 701 P.2d 939, 950-51 (Kan. 1985). The
legislature consequently repealed the statute and enacted a new one in its place. Coburn
v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 985 (D. Kan. 1985). The new law provides for the
admissibility of insurance and any benefit plan or program provided by law. Id. However,
in Coburn v. Agustin, the federal court once again found § 60-471 unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds despite the legislature's modifications. Id. at 996-97. The court,
applying heightened scrutiny, found that the benefits conferred on health care providers,
but denied to other tortfeasors, and the detriments imposed on plaintiffs injured via
medical malpractice but not to other plaintiffs, were not sufficiently related to the
legislative goal of improved health care. Id.
178. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471 (repealed 1985).
179. See id.; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (West 2003); Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 35;
Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 754-55 (Ariz. 1977).
180. See Hearing, supra note 2.
181. See Hearing, supra note 2; Martin, supra note 16, at 621; Will, supra note 11.
182. Falker, supra note 3, at 12.
183. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (West 2003); N.Y. JUD. LAW ANN. §
474-a (McKinney Supp. 2003).
184. See N.Y. JUD. LAW ANN. § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 2003).
185. Id. § 474-a(2).
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fee schedule that reduces the contingent fee as the award increases. ' 6
Therefore, according to the statute, if a jury awards $2 million in
damages, the attorney would receive $300,000, which is half of what the
attorney would receive if the standard contingency of 30% were
applied. 87 This is significant because it decreases the incentive for
attorneys to take malpractice cases on a contingency basis.
2. Arizona
Unlike New York, Arizona's version of an attorney fee limitation
statute does not outline specific fee percentages, but instead legislates the
right of any party in a medical malpractice action to review attorneys'
fees.'88  Upon such a request, the court shall determine the
reasonableness of both parties' attorneys' fees, taking into consideration
a variety of factors including the case's degree of difficulty, community
standards for fees, and other work lost by the attorney as a result of the
case. 9 This plan allows for the limitation of attorneys' fees while still
maintaining a certain degree of flexibility.'90
F. Tort Reform: Periodic Payments of Damages
In response to medical malpractice insurance crises, many states have
enacted laws that include periodic payment provisions that permit
periodic installment payments of large awards for future damages. '9'
These statutes aim to ease the burden of paying one lump sum for costly
jury awards.' 92 This is significant because insurance companies likewise
186. Id. The statute mandates that attorneys will collect 30% of the first $250,000
recovered, 25% of the next $250,000 recovered, 20% of the next $500,000 recovered, 15%
of the next $250,000 recovered, and only 10% of any amount that is over $1,250,000 of the
total sum recovered. Id.
187. See id. The attorney would receive $300,000 because: 30% of 250,000 + 25% of
250,000 + 20% of 500,000 + 15% of 250,00 + 10% of (2,000,000 -1,250,000) = $300,000.
188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (McKinney 2003).
189. Id. § 12-568(A)1.-8. Upon the request of one or both the parties, the court shall
determine the reasonableness of both parties' attorneys' fees, taking into consideration the
following factors: 1) time, labor, and difficulty involved and skill necessary; 2) likelihood
that participation in the lawsuit will preclude the attorney from accepting other
employment; 3) the customary fee charged; 4) the amount involved and the result
obtained; 5) the time limitations imposed; 6) the nature and length of the attorney-plaintiff
relationship; 7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; 8) and whether the
fee is fixed or contingent. Id.
190. Id. § 12-568.
191. Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ill. 1986) (listing examples of numerous
state statutes).
192. See id. at 772, 773. The states that have enacted periodic payment provisions for
cases of medical malpractice include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Florida, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at
772.
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will not be required to pay an expensive jury award all at once, thereby
rendering obstetricians less burdensome clients to cover.193
1. California
In California, for example, MICRA allows judges to order periodic
payments of damages at the request of either party, but only if the award
is equal to or greater than $50,000.194 In American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,'' the court upheld the
constitutionality of California's periodic payments provision despite the
claim that it infringed upon equal protection and due process
guarantees. 96 The Supreme Court of California found there was no
violation of plaintiff's substantive due process rights because the
provision was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in limiting
defendant's immediate obligation to pay for future damages in medical
malpractice cases.' 97 The court also concluded that section 667.7 of the
California Code did not infringe on the plaintiff's equal protection rights
even though the provision denies medical malpractice plaintiffs the
benefits of a lump-sum award.'9 In reaching this conclusion, the court
held that stare decisis mandates that a state can implement reform
measures on a piecemeal basis.'"
2. Illinois
The Illinois version of a statutory periodic payments provision is
similar to that of California, but Illinois law makes it slightly more
difficult for a defendant successfully to elect periodic payments of
damages. 2) The Illinois statute only allows periodic payments when
future damages exceed $250,000, and requires a defendant to show: 1)
that he or she can provide security for the amount of the total claim (past
and future damages), or that he or she can provide $500,000, whichever is
less; and 2) that future damages are likely to accrue for a period longer
2111than one year.
2112In Bernier v. Burris, this provision withstood equal protection and
due process challenges.0 3 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
193. See Hearing, supra note 2.
194. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 667.7(a) (Deering 1998).
195. 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984).
196. Id. at 672.
197. Id. at 676.
198. Id. at 677.
199. Id.; See also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955).
200. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1705 (West 1992).
201. Id. § 5/2-1705(c)(3)(ii).
202. 497 N.E.2d 763 (II1. 1986).
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provision was rationally related to the state's goal of ensuring the
availability and affordability of professional liability insurance.2 4 The
Bernier court found no due process violation because not only were the
plaintiff's objections merely speculative, but also because the "provisions
: , * contain certain safeguards designed to reduce the risk of
insolvency. '"2' 5
G. Insurance Reform
1. Experience-Rated Insurance
Researchers have found that while most acts of negligence never give
rise to a lawsuit, many lawsuits are brought and even won without
evidence of negligence. 06 Statistics show that most physicians rarely are
or never sued, with only a few "bad apples" experiencing frequent
suits.'07  For instance, according to one study, 55% of physicians
experienced zero malpractice claims in a seven-year period, while 79%
had fewer than two claims, and less than 3% had five or more claims....
These statistics have led to the development of insurance based on the
insured's individual experience of being sued.y This insurance system,
referred to as "experience rating," makes premiums directly dependent
on the number of claims that have been brought against the insured."0
When applied to malpractice insurance, premiums increase according to
the number of times a doctor is sued. " Unfortunately, experience rating
only has been experimented with statutorily in a few states and has not
yet been the subject of a major case.212
203. Id. at 773.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 774.
206. Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1618.
207. Id. at 1616-17.
208. Mark Taragin, et. al., Physician Malpractice: Does the Past Predict the Future?, 10
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 550, 552 (1995). According to the Federal Government's
National Practitioner Data Bank, between September 1990 and March 2003, one-third of
all the money paid in response to medical malpractice claims could be attributed to only
5% of the physicians making such payments. Daniel Eisenberg & Maggie Sieger, The
Doctor Won't See You Now, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 46, 58.
209. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1626.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See N.Y. INS. LAW, §§ 201, 203, 2343(d) (McKinney 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 175A § 5C (West 1998 & Supp. 2003); see also FRANK A. SLOAN, ET AL.,
INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 171-73 (describing the features of New York's and
Massachusetts' experience rating statutes).
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2. Hospitals or Physicians Creating Non-Profit Insurance Companies
Another area of insurance reform involves the creation of non-profit
insurance companies by hospitals or physicians. In New York City, for
example, many of the largest hospitals have instituted their own non-
profit insurance companies." '  In 1982, to remedy the high costs and
limited availability of medical malpractice insurance, the Washington
State Medical Association established a physician-owned and operated
professional liability company, the Washington State Physician's
214Insurance Exchange and Association.
II. GONE TO COURTROOM ... EVERY ONE: THE CURRENT REFORMS
ARE NOT ENOUGH
A. No-Fault Plans Directed at Obstetrics
No-fault systems, such as Virginia's and Florida's birth-related
neurological injury acts, do not require the claimant to prove that their
injury resulted from negligence in order to receive compensation."' This
system is based on the argument that the presence of negligence is not
strongly related to the incidence of adverse outcomes. Studies show that
the presence of negligence was not the most significant predictor of the
outcome of a lawsuit. 2 6 Rather, the most important factor in determining
whether or not a patient would recover in a legal action was the severity
of the patient's injury, regardless of whether any negligence actually
211
caused the injury.
One argument is that the mere threat of malpractice claims more
strongly may influence the way physicians practice than their actual
experience with past claims.2 s Indeed, the threat of a lawsuit, alone, is• • 219
enough to make some doctors practice defensive medicine. Doctors
213. Treaster, supra note 3, at A20.
214. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 245.
215. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
766.301 et. seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5001 - 38.2-5021 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003).
216. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1619 ("[Tjhe presence of negligence was
not a statistically significant predictor of the [lawsuit's] outcome.").
217. Id. Similarly, a 1984 study indicated that a negligent physician had only a 4%
chance of having to compensate the patient. Id. at 1618; See also Brennan et al., supra
note 15, at 1966 (citing a study that revealed little relation between the plaintiff's decision
to file a claim and the presence of negligence).
218. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 15,. at 1608.
219. See id. Another effect of high obstetric claims rates is an increase in the practice
of defensive medicine. See Bilimoria, supra note 31, at 270. Defensive medicine is the
phenomenon of proscribing procedures and ordering tests purely in an effort to reduce the
risk of lawsuits. See id. Physicians and insurance companies cite defensive medicine as a
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major reason why tort reform is needed. Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1606. Some
doctors consider the practice medically inappropriate, but feel that they have no choice
but to do it. See id. According to one study, in 1994, an estimated $9.9 billion was spent
annually on defensive medicine and an additional $15 billion can be attributed to the
liability system for superfluous procedures conducted solely to satisfy patient expectations.
Cerny, supra note 13, at 194. Another source also estimates that 15 to 30% of total
healthcare costs can be attributed to the practice of defensive medicine. Id. The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce estimates that American consumers pay between $60-100 billion
in these defensive medicine costs annually. Will, supra note 11. Defensive medicine,
which is viewed as being widely practiced by obstetricians, drives up the overall cost of
healthcare. See Falker, supra note 3, at 17-18; Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1607.
Some studies indicate that fear of a lawsuit may contribute to a greater incidence of
cesarean sections. Falker, supra note 3, at 15-16. For instance, a Pennsylvania State
University study revealed that the odds of performing a cesarean section were 15% more
likely where the hospital's obstetricians, as a group, had experienced a certain amount of
litigation in the previous four years. Id. at 16. Similarly, a Journal of American Medical
Association study of cesarean section rates in New York indicated that the regions where
medical malpractice insurance premiums were three times greater than other regions also
had a cesarean section rate that was three times greater than those regions with low
premiums. Id. at 15. See generally A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between
Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366 (1993) (detailing a study that
reveals that a positive relationship exists between medical malpractice claims and the rate
of cesarean delivery). But see Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1607 (suggesting that
other researchers have found that where the obstetrician is at a greater risk of being sued,
the less likely the doctor is to perform a cesarean section). See generally A. Dale Tussing,
PhD & Martha A. Wojtowycz, MA, The Cesarean Decision in New York State, 1986:
Economic and Noneconomic Aspects, 30 MED. CARE 529, 539 (1992) (detailing a study
that indicates that there is a negative relationship between fear of malpractice and
cesarean section use); Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on Cesarean
Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491 (1999) (discussing a study that suggests that
increased cesarean sections resulting from medical malpractice fear have only a small
impact on total obstetric care costs). Some researchers argue that the increased costs
associated with defensive medicine also are evident in the widespread use of electronic
fetal monitors (EFM) and increased time spent with patients. See Falker, supra note 3, at
17-18. Despite the negativity surrounding the practice of defensive medicine, some critics
assert that, as with defensive driving, defensive medicine actually is beneficial because it
forces doctors to deliver better care to patients. Bilimoria, supra note 31, at 272.
According to an editorial in a 1993 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, "If we
were to find that the tort system was producing more defensive driving, and we asked the
public if they supported such an incentive, my guess is that the vast majority, including
most physicians, would say it was a good thing." Kenneth Jost, Still Warring Over Medical
Malpractice, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 68. The fear of litigation and liability is so pervasive
that academic centers incorporate defensive medicine practices into the education that
medical students receive. See Falker, supra note 3, at 14. According to the New England
Journal of Medicine, as medical malpractice rates increase, medical schools have tailored
their curriculums and practices to address the changing face of medicine in such a litigious
society. Id. at 14 & n.5. For example, the fear of lawsuits has spurred many medical
schools to spend a significant amount of time on teaching students how to avoid lawsuits
and how to be prepared to answer if one arises. Time spent on teaching defensive
medicine cuts into the amount of hands-on experience these future physicians receive, and
ironically, causes them to be less prepared for actual practice and therefore more likely to
experience a lawsuit, the very thing defensive medicine aims to avoid. See id. at 14.
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especially want to do what is necessary to avoid claims, because such
claims would push their already costly insurance premiums even
higher.22° Fear of litigation pressures providers to avoid both negligent
injury and non-negligent adverse events."'
Some of the expected advantages of a no-fault system include reduced
legal costs, less delay in monetary recovery, shorter time involvement on
the part of the doctors, and decreased incidence of defensive medicine
222due to the strict liability nature of no-fault. Patients, hospitals, and
physicians most likely will find a no-fault system appealing where
avoidable adverse events are identified and patients are compensated
appropriately. 223 Proponents of no-fault, for instance, suggest that this
system gives physicians the freedom to practice in an environment
without worrying about the economic and psychological effects of
litigation. 24 They argue that a focus on avoidable adverse events may
help to eliminate the idea that negligence is morally wrong and therefore
should be hidden.225 Under this theory, a no-fault system would foster
the view that mistakes should undergo open evaluation and
compensation, existing not as immoral blemishes but as errors to be
studied in an effort to avoid future mistakes.226
Nevertheless, some opponents of no-fault liability systems argue that
such systems are inherently flawed. 22' This argument is based on the
assumption that courts will hold some doctors liable for failure to prevent
a bad outcome, even after they did everything in their power to treat a
patient.228 For many, this would offend the ideals of both justice and
individual accountability.229  Conversely, for those cases that involve
avoidable instances of negligence, a no-fault system by its very name
removes any degree of personal physician responsibility. 230 Therefore,
opponents suggest that no-fault systems do not deter negligence as
effectively as does tort liability.231 This is because deterrence among
doctors is based largely on fear of the embarrassment of a courtroom
220. See Treaster, supra note 3.
221. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1608.
222. See id. at 1628-29.
223. See id. at 1629.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1628. According to the Mello & Brennan article, "Regrettably, in
medicine such events are hidden under the cloaks of peer review and attorney-client
privilege." Id.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 16, at 623-24.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 624.
231. See id.
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trial where one's mistakes meticulously receive experience detailing.232
Opponents further argue that "no-fault" really means "no-deterrence,"
because people generally are not motivated to avoid certain behavior if
they are not held personally responsible for the outcomes of that
behavior. 33
However, hard empirical evidence supporting deterrence theory
remains scarce, especially in relation to the practice of obstetrics. For
example, studies have not indicated that the quality of care depends on
the obstetrician's history of malpractice claims."' Indeed, a study
published in The Journal of the American Medical Association that
examined the effect of malpractice threat on various birth outcomes
found no conclusive relationship between positive outcomes and a
236
meager prior claims record 3.
Such studies undoubtedly have influenced the creation of no-fault
plans, such as those established in Virginia and Florida, which are
tailored to address the needs of obstetricians and their patients. 37 Given
the fact that claims stemming from birth-related injuries are among the
most expensive and most common, the Virginia and Florida legislatures
2381were justified in focusing on such injuries. Unfortunately, the
implementation of these statutes has not proven as successful as one
239might hope. In Florida, for example, the costly tort claims of the type
NICA was designed to eliminate are still common, suggesting that NICA
is not really working.2 40 Despite the fact that NICA has been in effect for
almost ten years, Florida obstetricians nevertheless face the highest
premiums in the country.24' However, some researchers argue that the
true benefits of Florida and Virginia's no-fault plans are found in their
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Mello & Brennan, supra note 15, at 1604.
235. See id. at 1607. According to a study conducted by the Journal of the American
Medical Association, "A review of obstetric-care medical records for sentinel markers of
errors and other indicators of substandard care found no relationship between the
provider having been punished by the malpractice system and having fewer future
deviations from the standard of care." Id. at 1607-08.
236. Id. at 1608.
237. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-
Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 225, 229
(2001).
238. See Hearing, supra note 2.
239. See Martin, supra note 16, at 620-21 (indicating "that high cost tort claims, of the
type that the no-fault [Florida statute] was designed to eliminate, persist").
240. Id.
241. See Hearing, supra note 2. For instance, in 2001, the annual premiums in South
Florida were as high as $210,576, which, according to the Medical Liability Monitor, were
the highest in the United States. Id.
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efficiency-namely their speed of resolution and lower administrative
costs. 42  Such a benefit is significant, given that one of the strongest
criticisms of the current medical malpractice tort system is its
inefficiency.143 According to a 1992 United States General Accounting
Office Study of Medical Malpractice Alternatives, resolving a medical
malpractice claim in the tort system took an average of thirty-three
months. 44
Another benefit of the Virginia and Florida Acts may be found in thenatue o th r •245
nature of their compensation. For instance, according to a study of
compensation outcomes for birth-related injury, NICA recipients broke
even while families who received tort settlements were over-
compensated.246  The study also concluded that medical expenses of
NICA recipients were adequately compensated for, but that income loss
was not. 24  Despite this fact, the study found that overall, NICA
2481recipients were satisfied with their compensation.
However, there are some significant structural problems with NICA
249
and Virginia's similar plan. Most notable is that the narrow definition
of birth-related injury covered by these statutes threatens the very
victims they were intended to protect."" The definition in the Virginia
statute, for example, is so narrow that only a small handful of injuries fall
under the statute each year, resulting in a negligible number of claims
251being filed. Without broader definitions, such statutes shut out certain
catastrophic birth-related injuries, or at the very least, require families to
endure litigation, which is exactly what these no-fault systems were
designed to avoid.252 Similarly, the small incidence of claims filed under
these statutes indicates that obstetricians still need comprehensive
malpractice insurance coverage to cover the many claims that do not fall
242. See, e.g., Studdert, supra note 237, at 229. But see Martin, supra note 16, at 621
(stating that the Florida statute "has not met its expectaions" of, among other things,
reduced costs).
243. See Cerny, supra note 13, at 193.
244. Id.
245. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009
(Michie 2002); Frank A. Sloan, et al., The Road From Medical Injury to Claims Resolution:
How No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 65 (1997).
246. Sloan et al., supra note 245, at 61.
247. See id. at 61, 65-66.
248. Id. at 66.
249. Falker, supra note 3, at 20-22 (discussing the Virginia statute); Martin, supra note
16, at 644 (discussing the Florida statute).
250. Martin, supra note 16, at 644; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.302(2); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-5001.
251. Falker, supra note 3, at 22; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001.
252. Martin, supra note 16, at 643.
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under the statute."' Therefore, most insurance companies still perceive
Virginia and Florida obstetricians as high risk clients and consequently
254
maintain high premiums. For this reason, the Virginia and Florida
statutes that focus on certain neurological birth-related injuries are
ineffective in combating the malpractice. Although these attempts to
resolve the malpractice insurance crisis have been relatively unsuccessful,
a more effective no-fault system could be developed, and legislatures
should continue to explore additional remedies.
B. Statute of Limitations
Statutes that impose reduced time periods in which plaintiffs may file
medical malpractice claims are designed to promote greater certainty
among insurance carriers in terms of their risk of liability for a given
period of coverage.2" This increased certainty lends itself to premiums
that more accurately reflect the liability facing insurance companies
when they provide coverage to obstetricians.2 " For example, California's
MICRA includes a statute of limitations provision intended to foster
such certainty and thereby reduce medical malpractice insurance
premiums. In fact, all of MICRA's provisions are designed "to reduce
the cost of malpractice insurance by limiting the amount and timing of
recovery in cases of [medical malpractice]. 256 It seems that MICRA has
been effective in producing its desired results.9 As a testament to
MICRA's efficacy, ACOG endorses MICRA as the most comprehensive
and successful medical tort reform in the United States . MICRA has
been tremendously successful in reducing the cost of medical liability
insurance, as California premiums, once the highest in the country in
1975, were well below the national average in 1991, and in 2001,
premiums for California obsetricians were less than half of what
253. See Hearing, supra note 2.
254. See id.; Martin, supra note 16, at 643-44.
255. See Young v. Haines, 718 P.2d 909, 918-19 (Cal. 1986).
256. See id.
257. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 340.5 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2003).
258. W. Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 876 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Cal.
1994).
259. Tanya Albert, Nevada Enacts Bold Tort Reforms: Legal Challenges Are Still To
Come Though, So Any Impact On Physicians' Liability Insurance Premiums Will Likely
Be Determined by the Courts and Insurers, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/08/26/gvllO826.htm. According to the article,
"[MICRAI has withstood court challenges, and insurers say it has helped them keep rates
more stable." Id.; see also Caps, supra note 13 (noting that California's MICRA "cap has
played a pivotal role in stabilizing the health care delivery system for women in
California").
260. Caps, supra note 13.
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obstetricians in the rest of the country were paying.26 In fact, medical
malpractice premiums for most of California's hospitals decreased by
26225% in the years immediately following MICRA's enactment. Thus,
statutes modeled after MICRA, containing a three-year statute of
limitations provision, likely will be effective in combating the rising
malpractice insurance premiums that are forcing obstetricians to stop
263delivering babies.
C. Jury Award Caps and the Elimination of Putative Damages
Limitations on the amount of money juries can award plaintiffs for
non-economic damages arguably are the most important and necessary
form of tort reform 64 Those in favor of such caps point to the escalation
of medical malpractice jury awards throughout the country. 265 For
instance, from 1997 to 1998, the average number of awards higher than
$1 million rose by 39%, increasing by 45% from 1998 to 1999.26'
Similarly, in 1993, the average medical liability award was $500,000, but
by 1999 it had increased to $800,000, while the median medical liability
settlement climbed 63%, from $400,000 to over $650,000.267 ACOG
faults litigation in those states with no jury award limitations as the
268
culprit for these increases.
For those states with no award caps, learning from California's success
269
and enacting cap statutes similar to the one in MICRA may prove wise.
ACOG cites MICRA's jury award cap as having played an integral role
in helping to ensure that California women have access to healthcare by
encouraging many obstetricians to continue delivering babies. 70
MICRA's $250,000 cap on non-economic damages such as pain and
suffering likely has played a role in the stabilization of California's
261. Cerny, supra note 13, at 194; see also Brendan Doherty, California's Low
Malpractice Rates Are No Medical Error for Docs, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001,
available at http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2001/10/15/story6.html.
In 2001, the typical cost of premiums for a California obstetrician was $35,000 to $40,000,
while Pennslyvania obstetricians were paying $80,000 to $120,000. Id.
262. Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty. Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 660 P.2d 829,
840 (Cal. 1984).
263. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 340.5 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2003).
264. See Hearing, supra note 2; Treaster, supra note 3; Caps, supra note 13.
265. Id.
266. Charles B. Hammond, The Decline of the Profession of Medicine, 100
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 221, 224 (2002).
267. Id.
268. See Hearing, supra note 2.
269. See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3333.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); Cerny, supra note
13, at 194.
270. Caps, supra note 13.
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medical malpractice insurance rates.27" ' According to ACOG, "[w]ithout
a cap on non-economic damages women's access to healthcare will suffer.
Every dollar an obstetrician spends on liability insurance translates into
one less dollar available for women's health care. 2 72 Accordingly, those
in favor of jury award caps cite them as the key to resolving the current
medical malpractice insurance crisis.
Unfortunately, one result of these caps may be that some legitimate
victims of negligence suffer because some lawyers refuse to represent
malpractice victims when a cap is in place.273 Those opposed to jury
award ceilings also say that the threat of costly settlements encourages
doctors and hospitals to exercise the utmost caution, which in turn,
improves overall quality of care.274 Accordingly, some exholt high jury
awards in the name of just compensation, retribution, or deterrence.
However, while high jury awards may deter some negligence, if they
encourage attorneys to file more claims than they would otherwise, then
such awards cannot be said to deter malpractice litigation overall.276
Regardless of their impacts on deterrence, if the goal is to reduce
malpractice insurance premiums, the evidence certainly suggests that jury
award caps are effective in achieving this goal.277
The logic behind statutes that impose jury award caps is very similar to
the logic behind statutes that eliminate punitive damages. Punitive
damages, although rare, historically have accounted for some of the
highest jury awards in medical malpractice cases.278 According to Justice
Powell, "[i]n most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded
is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive.
Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. 2 79 By
eliminating punitive damages in malpractice lawsuits, juries will be
prevented from utilizing this often unbridled form of punishment,
therefore helping to reduce the risk that malpractice cases will result in
astronomical jury awards. This reduced risk should help curb rising
271. Treaster, supra note 3.
272. See Caps, supra note 13.
273. Treaster, supra note 3.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. Falker, supra note 3, at 12-13.
277. See Albert, supra note 260; Treaster, supra note 3; Caps, supra note 13.
278. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 776 (I11. 986); Valerie Hans & Stephanie
Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497,
1515-16 (2003); see also Hearing, supra note 2 (citing $100 million awarded by a
Philadelphia jury in an obstetric-related medical malpractice case).
279. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
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insurance premiums, thereby discouraging obstetricians from giving up
the practice of obstetrics.
D. Abolition of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is another mechanism by which jury awards
reach outlandish proportions. According to the Eastin court, this rule
has allowed plaintiffs to double and even triple their recovery. By
abolishing this rule, and admitting evidence of collateral benefits
received by plaintiffs, juries more accurately can assess the amount of
money that is truly needed to compensate the plaintiffs for their injuries.
Doran and Eastin suggest that if a law that abolishes the collateral source
rule is found constitutional, it must involve a complete abolition, as was
done in Arizona, and not a partial abolition, as was done in Kansas.28 A
law calling for total abolition must allow the admissibility of all benefits
received by the injured party, whether gratuitous or from insurance.282
E. Monetary Limitations on Plaintiff Attorney Fees
The President's Council of Economic Advisors estimates that fifty-
eight cents of every dollar from tort settlements goes to administrative
and defense costs, and especially to attorney fees, which constitute the
highest overhead.283 In light of such a startling statistic, statutes that
place limits on attorney contingency fees in malpractice cases, such as
2814New York's statute, aim to lower malpractice insurance rates by
discouraging the likelihood of filing suits with costly damages at stake.
By reducing the contingency percentage as the damages go higher, New
York's statute ensures that more money goes to the plaintiff and reduces
the incentive for attorneys to ask for damages greater than $1.25 million,
because any amount above this will result only in a 10% contingency fee
2815for the attorney.
F. Periodic Payments
Statutes that allow for the payment of damages by periodic
installments aim to reduce the burden of requiring a physician's
insurance company to pay the damages in one lump sum. Given the fact
that lawsuits involving obstetricians often result in high jury awards, such
statutes are effective tools in the effort to make obstetricians more
280. Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz. 1977).
281. Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30, 36-38 (D. Kan. 1981); Eastin, 570 P.2d at 751-52.
282. Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 37.
283. Will, supra note 11.
284. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 2003).
285. See id. § 474-a(2).
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attractive clients for insurance companies. These statutes also help
ensure that plaintiffs do not spend the awards for future damages before
2816the damages are actually incurred.
III. GONE TO DELIVER BABIES... EVERY ONE: HOW TO KEEP OUR
OBSTETRICIANS WHERE THEY BELONG - IN THE DELIVERY ROOM
Regardless of the various levels of efficacy of the aforementioned
statutory reform options, some action is necessary before pregnant
women across the country are left without obstetricians. As a result of
the medical malpractice insurance crisis, women's access to healthcare is
clearly in jeopardy.2s ACOG outlines the following problems as part of
the larger maternal healthcare access crisis: fewer obstetric providers, a
rural crisis, community clinic cutbacks, less prenatal care, less
preventative healthcare, and more uninsured patients."" Access to
prenatal care, already considered a problem by many physicians and
public health scholars, is diminished further as a result of the rising/ • • 289
insurance rates that force obstetricians to leave their practices.
286. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 773 (II1. 1986).
287. See The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, A COG's Action
Agenda for the 107th Congress, at http://www.acog.org/from-home/departments
govtrel/action02.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). According to ACOG, "[t]oday, litigation
is driving premiums up, recreating a shortage of obstetric care. Skyrocketing premiums
have forced ob-gyns to retire early, discontinue the obstetric side of their practice, or
relocate-leaving mothers around the country without access to care." Id.
288. See Caps, supra note 13. According to ACOG, rising insurance premiums lead to
an increase in overall healthcare costs, which in turn, discourage employers from offering
insurance benefits. Id. Many women then lose their insurance coverage, and those whose
incomes are above the poverty guidelines are ineligible for Medicaid. Id. The end result is
an overall increase in the number of uninsured women of childbearing age, which, at 11.7
million in 2001, cannot afford to go any higher. Id.; see also infra notes 7-20 and
accompanying text (discussing how rising medical malpractice insurance premiums have
led to a shortage of obstetrical providers). Excessive litigation and the staggering
premiums that result not only threaten women's access to obstetric care, but threaten their
access to gynecologic care as well. See Hearing, supra note 2. As staggering premiums
continue to burden women's healthcare professionals, women may not have adequate
access to all the gynecological services they need. Id. These imperative services consist of:
"regular screenings for gynecologic cancers [including breast cancer], hypertension, high
cholesterol, diabetes, osteoporosis, sexually transmitted diseases, and other serious health
problems." Id.
289. See Caps, supra note 13. This occurs because the rates not only tax the overall
maternal healthcare system, but also increase the distances that women have to travel for
prenatal care, thereby discouraging some women from obtaining all the prenatal care they
need. See id. Notwithstanding the malpractice crisis in obstetrics, ensuring adequate
prenatal care for low-income inner-city women always has been difficult; it is a challenge
already hindered by poverty, drug use, and lack of social support. See Schleuning et al.,
supra note 5, at 47.
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Unfortunately, the obstetric shortage hurts poor and disadvantaged
women the most.29°  Many of these women rely on community care
clinics, which are being forced to limit the number of patients they help
due to the fact that they cannot shift some of the cost of higher insurance
premiums onto their patients, who are largely uninsured. 29 1 The result is
that many of these women are left without access to obstetric care.292 The
situation is worst in rural areas where the problem undoubtedly has
293reached crisis status. As opposed to urban communities, rural
communities tend to depend on a relatively small number of physicians
and a single hospital, which means that when rural physicians leave
obstetrics, local access to obstetrical services rapidly deteriorates.294
Clearly, women's access to obstetric care, particularly that of poor and
rural women, hangs in the balance as obstetricians stop delivering babies
in record numbers due to rapidly increasing malpractice insurance
premiums.9
290. See Hearing, supra note 2; Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47.
291. Caps, supra note 13. Certain groups of vulnerable women, such as rural residents
and medically indigent women, tend to be more dependent on family physicians than
obstetricians for obstetric services. See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 3, at 248. Therefore,
the fact that family physicians are giving up obstetrics more rapidly than obstetricians will
have a particularly harmful impact on these women's access to healthcare. See id.
292. See Caps, supra note 13.
293. See id. See generally Rena J. Gordon et al., The Effect of Malpractice Liability on
the Delivery of Rural Obstetric Care, 3 J. RURAL HEALTH POLICY 7 (1987) (detailing the
rates at which rural providers have been leaving obstetrics and the pregnancy outcomes in
light of the decreased availability of obstetric care); Roger A. Rosenblatt & Barbara
Detering, Changing Patterns of Obstetric Practice in Washington State: The Impact of Tort
Reform, 20 FAMILY MED. 101 (1988) (detailing a study that found that rapidly increasing
medical malpractice insurance premiums among obstetricians result in reduced access to
obstetric care in rural areas and a severe curtailment of care to the medically indigent).
294. See Schleuning et al., supra note 5, at 47-51. Changes affecting the practice of
obstetrics, such as increasing malpractice insurance premiums, are most disrupting to the
lives of rural physicians. Id. at 51. However, rural physicians are less likely to have a voice
in any of the reform efforts because they tend to live far from the urban centers where
policy is made and implemented. Id. Even if they are able to get involved, their heavy
workload and geographic isolation make it difficult to have a meaningful impact in
committee work and lobbying. Id. Being hit with astonishingly high medical malpractice
insurance rates, the economic security of these rural obstetricians was already shaky due
to "sparse population, low insurance reimbursement for pregnancy services, and growing
managed care constraints." Caps, supra note 13.
295. See Hearing, supra note 2. On June 30, 2002, the Methodist Hospital in South
Philadelphia closed its maternity ward for the first time since its founding in 1892, thereby
leaving the women of that area of the city, many of whom are economically disadvantaged,
without easily accessible obstetrical care. Id. In the summer of 2002, at least six hospitals
throughout the country closed their obstetric wards due to the soaring costs of malpractice
insurance. Treaster, supra note 3. Currently, no obstetricians are practicing in Yazoo City,
Mississippi, a city of 14,550 people. Hearing, supra note 2. In December 2001, a survey of
ob-gyns in Las Vegas, Nevada, revealed that 60% were planning to drop obstetrics after
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Given the current state of women's access to obstetric care, the overall
goal of any solution must be to lower the insurance premiums that are
forcing obstetricians out of business. However, an effective solution
should do so without losing sight of the tort system's overall goals, which
include deterrence, fairness for both obstetrician and patient,
compensation for those who deserve it, and efficiency.
With this in mind, the solution proposed by this Comment is multi-
faceted and comprised of both tort and insurance reform with short and
long-term remedies, made possible through federal initiative.
Specifically, the federal government immediately should enact legislation
that establishes a uniform medical malpractice insurance reform plan
modeled after MICRA. This plan should include provisions for a statute
of limitations, elimination of the collateral source rule, periodic
payments, and most importantly, jury award caps. 96
the nation's second largest liability insurance carrier announced it would no longer renew
the physicians' policies. Id.
296. Federal lawmakers previously have introduced several bills that provide for
medical liability reform, but have been unsuccessful in achieving their passage. See, e.g.,
John Koziol, LRGH Physician Backs Sen. Gregg's Reform Initiative: Reining in OB-GYN
Liability Costs, THE CITIZEN, Feb. 20, 2004, available at http://wwww4.citizen.com
/healthbeat/News2004/February2004/Healthnews 02_02.04a.asp (last visited Feb. 20,
2004). In 2002, Senator John Ensign (R-Nev.) and Representative Jim Greenwood (R-
Pa.) introduced bills that provide for federal tort reform and that are specifically designed
to address the escalating medical malpractice insurance premiums facing the nation's
healthcare delivery system. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care
(HEALTH) Act of 2002, H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted); Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2002, S. 2793, 107th Cong.
(2002); American College of Cardiology, Safeguarding Patients' Access to Care, at
http://www.acc.org/advocacy/advoc-issues/ talkingpoints4_29.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2003); These bills call for the enactment of the HEALTH Act of 2002. See H.R. 4600
(enacted); S. 2793. The Act includes, among other things, a statute of limitations
provision, a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages, a limit on punitive damages, a
collateral source provision, a safeguard against unreasonable attorneys' fees, and a
periodic payments provision. H.R. 4600 (enacted); S. 2793; see also American College of
Cardiology, Safeguarding Patients' Access to Care, supra; In September 2002, the House
passed H.R. 4600 by a vote of 217-203. American College of Cardiology, Advocacy
Weekly, at http://www.acc.org/advocacy/weekly/archives/sep_02/093002.htm (last modified
Sept. 30, 2002). However, the companion Senate bill never made it past the Judiciary
Committee. Tanya Albert, Medical Liability Crisis: Tort Reform Bill Goes to Congress,
AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 24, 2003. The following year, the HEALTH Act of 2003 was
introduced; however, this tort reform bill, nearly identical to its predecessor, the
HEALTH Act of 2002, suffered a similar fate. See id.; Tanya Albert, Senate Fails on Tort
Reform, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 11, 2003, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2003/08/1lledsaO8ll.htm. After passage by the House, the bill was
blocked by a Democratic filibuster in the Senate. Id. Nonetheless, in 2004, Senator
Ensign, this time joined by New Hampshire's Senator Judd Gregg, once again introduced
tort legislation in the Senate. See Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care
Act of 2003, S. 2061, 108th Cong. (2004). Acknowledging that his attempts at general
medical liability reform proved unsuccessful, Senator Ensign's latest bill marks the
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In terms of insurance reform, the federal plan should encourage the
formation of physician-owned insurance companies by providing grants
to state medical associations for the purposes of establishing such
companies. The plan also should require, or at the very least provide
incentives for, insurers of physicians and hospitals to base their premiums
on an experience rating system that takes into account physicians' history
of claims and acknowledges the fact that only a few "bad apple" doctors
are responsible for the majority of malpractice claims.
The federal plan should call for the establishment of a National
Medical Malpractice Review Board. This review board would be
comprised of physicians, lawyers, public health officials, legislators, and
insurance company representatives. The Board would oversee the
implementation of the plan and also would serve as a consultant to the
legislature on any matters relating to medical malpractice. In light of
research on the effects of a poor doctor-patient relationship, the Board
also would establish a committee devoted to promoting healthier doctor-
297patient relationships. This committee would be responsible for
sponsoring clinics and conferences that focus on this issue with an
emphasis on improving certain physician skills such as effective
communication, empathetic listening, and patience.
Finally, in light of the disturbing statistics suggesting that trial outcome
does not depend on physician negligence, the legislation should establish
a committee to investigate the possibility of removing medical
malpractice claims from the tort system all together. Based on the
beginning of a specialty-specific approach to tort reform. Id. The Healthy Mothers and
Healthy Babies Access to Care Act focuses on the liability problems facing obstetricians
and is modeled after California's MICRA. Id.; see also ACOG News Release, Senators
Did Not Rise Above Politics to Protect Prenatal and Delivery Care (Feb. 25, 2004), at
http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/pressreleases/nr02-25-04.cfm. The Act
includes, among other things, a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages, a collateral
source provision, a statute of limitations provision, guidelines for the award of punitive
damages, a safeguard against unreasonable attorneys' fees, and a periodic payments
provision. S. 2061. The Act also imposes the clear and convincing evidence standard as
the required burden of proof in cases where the plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Id.
Unfortunately, the bill succumbed to partisan politics and was defeated by a Senate vote
of 48-45. See ACOG News Release, supra.
297. Research suggests that tension in the doctor-patient relationship also may play a
role in the frequency of medical malpractice claims. See Falker, supra note 3, at 8-11.
According to a study conducted by the American Medical Association (AMA), a patient's
degree of dissatisfaction with her obstetrician was "highly correlated" with her tendency to
sue. Id. at 9-10. Other studies cited ineffective doctor-patient communication and the
patient's perception that the doctor did not have time for her as major sources of
dissatisfaction. See id. at 8-9. Such a relationship is ripe for the existence of
misunderstanding, mistrust, and anger, therefore making it more likely that a patient will
sue her doctor if an adverse outcome in medical care arises. See id. Consequently, it
appears that a negative doctor-patient relationship contributes to the disproportionately
high rate of claims burdening obstetricians. Id. at 2, 8-9.
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principles behind no-fault compensation, the committee would
determine the feasibility and constitutionality of a system where claims
were addressed and resolved by a panel of medical and legal experts,
thereby effectuating what the tort system is supposed to do: ensure
justice. This would eliminate the injustice of non-negligent doctors being
held responsible and ordered to pay for injuries and disabilities they did
not cause, yet at the same time provide financial assistance to those who
need it. Given the complexity and technicality of medical malpractice
claims, the committee also would explore the possibility of creating
special medical courts, which would be run by expert judges. Similar to
our system of separate tax, patent, and workers' compensation courts,
these medical courts would reduce the likelihood of trial outcomes
determined on the basis of severity of plaintiff injury (and corresponding
juror sympathy), rather than negligence. In short, this committee would
work to find a long-term solution that would ensure justice for all and
possibly replace the legislation's above-described short-term remedies.
The overall goal of the federal legislation would be to reduce and
stabilize the medical malpractice insurance premiums that are rising so
rapidly . Because obstetricians face disproportionately higher insurance
rates, the reform provisions encompassed in this plan undoubtedly will
benefit obstetrics and other "high risk specialties" the most. Therefore,
this plan, or something very similar, would help ensure access to
healthcare for women in America.
IV. CONCLUSION
The medical malpractice crises of the past three decades mostly were
marked by rapidly increasing malpractice insurance premiums and high
jury awards-a trend that hit the practice of obstetrics the hardest.
Currently, obstetricians across the country are giving up the very thing
that defines their specialty: the delivery of babies. Clearly something
needs to be done. If no action is taken, this country soon will be on the
brink of a serious shortage of the doctors that help effectuate the most
basic of human functions, leaving women to face an unprecedented
barrier to their access to healthcare.
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